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We analyze the strategic interactions among end-users and between end-users and a hacker.  
We show that security efforts by end users are strategic substitutes.  This explains the inertia 
among end-users in taking precautions even in the face of grave potential consequences. Next, 
we analyze the direct and indirect effects of changes in user fixing cost and the rate of 
enforcement against hacking.  For instance, a reduction in user fixing cost would directly lead 
users to increase fixing effort.  However, that would make them less attractive targets, and so 
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1. Introduction 
Information security is a critical issue of both national policy and business operations 
(Whitman 2003).  For instance, in May 2004, Sven Jaschan created the Sasser worm to 
exploit a vulnerability in the Windows 2000 and XP operating systems.  The Sasser worm 
and its variants caused hundreds of thousands of PCs to crash (ZDnet 2005).  In August 2003, 
the Microsoft Blaster worm exploited a vulnerability in Windows 2000 and XP to infect 
hundreds of thousands of computers, from which it launched a “denial of service” attack on 
the Microsoft Windows Update server (Register 2003).  During the summer of 2001, the 
“Code Red” worm and its successor “Code Red II” exploited a vulnerability in the Microsoft 
Internet Information Server to cause over $2 billion in damage (Moore et al. 2002).  The 
threat of attack and intrusion now extends to mobile phones (Symantec 2005).  
Information security depends on user efforts – to fix vulnerabilities, install and update 
software to detect neutralize viruses and other malicious software, install and configure 
firewalls, take care with file-sharing programs and email attachments, etc.  Indeed, vendors 
and public IT agencies regularly exhort users to take more precautions and generally improve 
security.1   
 Information security is a critical issue only because of the activities of (unethical) 
hackers.2  Industry has systematically tracked hacker behavior: “Attackers continuously look 
for easy targets, those that will provide them with the maximum return on the time they 
invest in writing malicious code” (Symantec 2005, page 55).  Clearly, hacker activity 
depends on user behavior.   
While there has been some research into the incentives of end-users (Kunreuther and 
Heal 2002, August and Tunca 2005), and the motivations of hackers (eg, Jordan and Taylor 
1998; Van Beveren 2000), there has been little scholarly attention to the strategic interaction 
between end-users and hackers. 
 In this paper, we analyze the strategic interactions among end-users and between end-
users and a hacker.  We address two questions in particular.  First, it is well known that 
information security poses grave potential consequences.  Yet, end-users seem quite slow to 
take precautions (Boss 2005) – to the point that they must be exhorted and goaded by 
government and vendors.  What explains this inertia? 
 Second, given the strategic interactions, how does information security vary with 
changes in user fixing cost and the rate of enforcement against hacking?   This question is not 
trivial.  For instance, a reduction in user fixing cost would directly lead users to increase 
fixing effort.  However, that would make them less attractive targets, and so induce less 
                                            
1 See, for instance, US-CERT (2006).  
2 We will focus on unethical hackers, and, for brevity, simply refer to them as “hackers”. 
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hacking, and hence, indirectly lead users to reduce fixing.  Accordingly, the net effect 
depends on the balance between direct and indirect effects. 
2. Prior Literature 
Information security is an issue of tremendous concern to governments and businesses 
worldwide (Whitman 2003).  Generally, it involves four groups of persons – users, hackers, 
software vendors, and security specialists such as CERT/CC.   Further, it is now recognized 
to be as much as an issue of economic incentives as a technological problem (Anderson 
2001). 
Most economic analysis has focused on the policies of software vendors, CERT/CC 
and other security specialists to disclose security flaws and provide the appropriate patches 
(see, for instance, Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, and Raghunathan 2004; Choi, Fershtman, and 
Gandal 2004; Nizovtsev and Thursby 2005; Arora, Caulkins, and Telang 2005; Jaisingh and 
Li 2005).  Other analyses have focused on users’ incentives to share information (Gal-Or and 
Ghose 2005) and implementation of detection systems (Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 
2005). 
 August and Tunca (2005) consider the behavior of users, and specifically, their 
incentive to patch security flaws.  In a finding that is reminiscent of the public-health 
literature on infectious diseases, they show that mandatory patching is not optimal (Brito et. 
al. 1991; Philipson 2001).  With commercial software, the optimal policy is a subsidy on 
patching when security risk and patching cost are high, and no policy otherwise.  However, 
with open-source software, the optimal policy is a subsidy on patching when both security 
risk and patching costs are low, and a tax on software usage otherwise.   
August and Tunca (2005) assume that users consider the risk of attack when deciding 
whether to fix their software.   This assumption is consistent with empirical analyses of crime 
and victim precautions.  For instance, in a study of migration from urban areas, Cullen and 
Levitt (1999) found that each additional reported crime was associated with a decline in 
urban population by about one person.  In particular, the migration of highly educated 
households and those with children was relatively more sensitive to crime. 
However, in the specific context of software security, the risk of attack did not have a 
significant effect on experimental subjects’ intention to take precautions (Boss 2005).  
Further, in a recent survey of residential Internet users, 78% of respondents felt “somewhat 
safe”, “not very safe”, or “not at all safe” from online threats, but only 67% protected 
themselves with a firewall (National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005).  Apparently, users are 
still slow to expend effort in information security.  The question is why? 
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 Kunreuther and Heal (2002) study a positive network externality among users in 
taking precautions against attack.  Specifically, they assumed that each user makes an all-or-
nothing choice between taking precautions or not taking precautions, and that, the expected 
loss to any user decreases with others’ precautions.  They show that, for a wide range of cost 
and risk parameters, there are two equilibria – either all users invest in precautions or no one 
does.   Kunreuther and Heal (2002), however, did not analyze why the expected loss to any 
user decreased with others’ precautions, and specifically, the role of hackers.3 
Previous research has not analyzed the economic incentives and behavior of hackers.  
The mentality of hackers has evolved over time, with greed, power, and revenge superseding 
curiosity and other benign motivations (Jordan and Taylor 1998).  Importantly, Van Beveren 
(2000) identified two external factors that encourage hackers – the perception that hacking is 
seldom punished and peer approval from other hackers.   
More recently, the motivation of hackers has shifted towards making money: “They 
often attempt to perpetrate criminal acts, such as identity theft, extortion, and fraud” 
(Symantec, 2005, page 4).  This portends greater losses as hackers aim “to create more 
malicious code and that will become stealthier and more selective” (Symantec 2005, page 9). 
By contrast with the previous research, we focus on the strategic interaction among 
end-users and between users and hackers. Our analysis shows how users’ effort in fixing 
depends on the hacker’s attacking effort and vice versa. Accordingly, we can show how 
changes in policy toward hackers will affect user behavior, and, also how policy changes 
toward users will influence hacker behavior. 
3. Basic Setting 
For concreteness, we consider a setting of software vulnerabilities, but note that similar 
conclusions apply to other contexts of information security.  Consider the market for some 
commercial software, which is produced by a monopoly and sold at a uniform price p .   (We 
assume a simple market structure, in order to focus on the interaction between end-users and 
hacker.) 
End-users derive benefit, v , from use.  The vendor would set price such that v p> , 
else there would be no demand.  End-users differ in naivete, n , which is distributed 
according to the cumulative distribution function, )(nΦ  between [0, 1], with 0 representing 
the least naïve (most sophisticated) user and 1 representing the most naïve user.  All users are 
risk-neutral. 
                                            
3 See also Varian (2004). 
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A software user suffers an attack with probability χα )( f , where )( fα is a 







ααα .     (1) 
and χ  is a probability that measures the effectiveness of hacker effort.  If the user suffers an 
attack, she will not derive any benefit from the software, and in addition, will suffer some 
harm, h .4  The user’s cost of patching the software is ncf .  Each potential user decides 
whether to buy and, if so, chooses fixing effort to maximize her expected net benefit.   
There is a single hacker, who chooses effort k  in hacking, which determines the 







χχχχ .     (2) 
The hacker derives enjoyment, e  from an attack on a user, provided that he is not discovered.   
With enforcement probability, η , the authorities discover the hacker and then impose a 
penalty with monetary value, s , and prevent his enjoyment.  Further, the cost of hacking 
effort is )(kcK , where  )(kcK  is convex in k , and to ensure that the equilibrium outcome is 
not trivial, we assume that the parameters are such that 
 
hv
vk +≤)(χ .         (3) 
The hacker chooses effort to maximize his expected net benefit.  This modeling 
assumption is consistent with Symantec’s (2005, page 55) observation that hackers direct 
efforts against targets that provide the maximum return on effort. 
The software publisher sets price p  to maximize profit.  The sequence of events is as 
follows: 
Figure 1: Sequence of events 
                                            
4  This set-up is similar to that in the literature on enforcement against copyright piracy (see, for 
instance, Chen and Png (2003)). 
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4. User-Hacker Equilibrium 
Consider the end-user with type (naivete), n .  If she buys the software, her expected net 
benefit, given the hacking level χ , would be 
  ncfphfvfnB −−−−= χαχαχ )(])(1[)|( .    (4) 
Figure 2: User fixing effort  
ncf
f
phv −−− αχαχ ]1[
 
Maximizing with respect to f ,  
nc
df





χ= − +      (5)  
which defines the net-benefit maximizing effort, )|( χnf , as a function of the user type and 
hacker effort.  By inspection of (5), we have5 
Observation 1.  User fixing effort, f , is continuous and decreasing in naivete, n , and fixing 
cost, c,  independent of price, p , and continuous and increasing in hacker effort, k , such that, 
if 0=k , then 0)( =nf , and there exists 0)( >∞ nf  such that )()(lim nfnfk ∞∞→ = .  
                                            







Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2006) 
© 2006, Png, Tang, and Wang 7
We next characterize the demand for the software.  By (4), every user for whom 
0)|( ≥χnB  will buy the software.  It is relatively straightforward to prove that )|( χnB  is 
decreasing in n .  Accordingly, we have 
Observation 2.  Either all users buy the software or there exists a marginal user, nˆ , defined 
by  
0)ˆ(ˆ))ˆ((][)ˆ( =−−+−= ncfnpnfhvvnB χα ,    (6) 
and such that only users with nn ˆ≤  buy the software.  
The demand for the software arises from the users with nn ˆ≤ , hence the quantity 
demanded (equal to the vendor’s sales) is  
 ∫ Φn nd
ˆ
0
)( .         (7) 
The following result shows how the demand for software depends on the hacker’s 
effort and the vendor’s price.   
Observation 3.  The marginal user type, nˆ , is continuous and decreasing in user fixing cost, 
c, and the price, p , and continuous, decreasing and convex in the hacker’s effort, k .  In 
addition, 1ˆlim 0 =→ nk  and 0ˆˆlim nnk =∞→ , where 0ˆ0 1n≤ ≤ . 
Having analyzed user behavior (choices of whether to buy the software and, if so, the 
fixing effort) as a function of the hacker’s efforts, we now consider the hacker’s effort as a 






−−⋅Φ−= ∫ ηχαη .   (8) 
By (2) and since )(kcK  is convex, the function H  is concave in k .   Maximizing H with 










)())((]1[ αχη ,      (9) 
which characterizes the hacker’s effort. 
Observation 4.  Hacker effort, k , is continuous and decreasing in the enforcement rate, η .  
Further, hacker effort, k , is continuous and increasing in the marginal user type, nˆ , and, if 
0ˆ =n , then 0)ˆ( =nk , and there exists some 01 >k  such that if 1ˆ =n , then 1)ˆ( knk = .   In 
addition, hacker effort, k , is continuous and decreasing in user fixing effort, f , and there 
exists some 00 >k  such that if 0=f , then 0kk = , and there exists some 0≥∞k  such that if 
∞→f , then ∞= kk .   
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Observation 4 is consistent with expert observations.  As Microsoft Internet Explorer 
dominated the market for Internet browsers, it became “an inviting target for hackers” and 
relatively less secure (cio.com 2005).  
For the analysis to be meaningful, we must show that there exists a non-trivial 
equilibrium.  To prove existence, it is useful to consider the rate at which software users are 
subject to security attack, conditional on hacker effectiveness, ( )kχ , i.e, the conditional 




( ) ( ( | )) ( )
n k
A k f n k d nα= Φ∫ .      (10) 
Accordingly, the function ( ) ( )A k kχ  is the rate at which software users actually suffer 
security attack, i.e, the effective vulnerability of users.   
Lemma 1 proves the existence of equilibrium by considering the relation between 
)(kA and hacking effort, k .   The effective vulnerability is a continuous decreasing function 
of hacker effort, and similarly, hacker effort is a continuous increasing function of the 
effective vulnerability of users.  Figure 3 illustrates the result. 
Lemma 1.  There exists a non-trivial equilibrium between end-users and hacker, *k , *ˆ( )n k  
and )|)(ˆ( ** kknf . 









Our first substantive result focuses on the strategic interaction among end-users.  Proposition 
1 shows that, given hacker behavior, users’ patching efforts are strategic substitutes (Bulow 
et al. 1985). 
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Proposition 1.  Given hacker behavior, user efforts in patching are strategic substitutes:  The 
higher the patching effort of others, the lower the patching effort of any particular individual. 
By contrast with our Proposition 1, Kunreuther and Heal (2002) suggest that user efforts in 
security are strategic complements, and that the equilibrium outcome is of an all-or-nothing 
nature – either all users or none take precautions.  By contract, our analysis implies that user 
efforts are strategic substitutes, hence the equilibrium outcome could involve an intermediate 
level of effort. 
Empirical evidence appears to lend stronger support to our analysis than that of 
Kunreuther and Heal (2002).   Table 1 reports data from an annual survey of U.S. residential 
computer users.  It suggests that users take an intermediate level of precautions, rather than 
follow an all-or-nothing approach. 
    Table 1:  User security measures 
Security measure 2004 2005 
Equipped with anti-virus software 85% 83% 
Equipped with properly configured firewall  28% 56% 
With active or open file sharing program  23% 11% 
Source: National Cyber Security Alliance, 2004 and 2005. 
The impact of Lojack in the U.S. provides further suggestive empirical evidence.  
Lojack is a concealed device that allows police to track a stolen vehicle.  Ayres and Levitt 
(1998) measured a significant positive externality from Lojack installation: when one owner 
installed Lojack, he/she significantly reduced the likelihood of the theft of other vehicles. 
Proposition 1 implies that a free-rider problem exists in user security.  If other users raise 
their fixing effort, they will reduce the expected harm to any particular user, and she will 
rationally respond by reducing her fixing effort.  This free-rider problem is reminiscent of 
that arising from concealed precautions, such as Lojack, by potential crime victims (Koo and 
Png 1994; Ayres and Levitt 1998).  
5. Empirical Implications 
The preceding analysis was “partial” in the sense that we considered only the direct effects of 
changes in vendor strategy and government policy, and ignored the indirect (feedback) 
effects through the actions of the other side of the market.  We now consider the effects of 
changes in vendor strategy and government policy on the equilibrium between users and 
hackers.  Accordingly, this analysis encompasses both direct and indirect effects. 
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Our model reveals that policy changes may induce countervailing feedback effects.  
Consider, for instance, an increase in the price, p, on the demand for software. An increase in 
price would directly reduce nˆ , i.e., lead some users to stop buying the software.  However, 
the price increase will also have an indirect (consequential) effect through the effect of user 
choices on hacking.  With fewer users buying the software, the hacker’s benefit would be 
lower, hence he will invest less effort, which reduces the probability of attack and so raises 
users’ expected net benefit. Thus, the indirect effect from the hacker tends to offset the direct 
effect of the price increase.  Accordingly, the demand for software is less elastic than would 
appear from studying the direct effect alone. 
Next consider an increase in enforcement, η . This directly leads the hacker to reduce 
his effort. However, there is also an indirect effect: users would respond to the reduced 
hacking by reducing their fixing effort, and also the demand for the software would increase.  
Accordingly, the net impact on security (as measured by the effective user vulnerability) 
depends on the balance of the direct and indirect effects. 
 Responding to public concern, software vendors have invested heavily to facilitate 
user fixing. For instance, in August 2004, Microsoft released Service Pack 2, to enhance user 
security.  What would be the impact of Microsoft’s action?  Our analysis points to some 
unintended effects: specifically, actions to reduce user fixing costs need not enhance overall 
security.  As reported in Proposition 2 below, actions to reduce user fixing costs would 
enhance overall security (as measured by effective user vulnerability) if the user fixing cost is 
sufficiently high, but reduce overall security if the user fixing cost is sufficiently low.  
Proposition 2.  Effective user vulnerability, Aχ , is decreasing in the enforcement rate, η , 
and increasing in the user fixing cost, c , if it is sufficiently high, but decreasing if it is 
sufficiently low. 
Table 2 summarizes the net effect on user’s fixing effort, hacker’s effort and software 
demand with regard to change in price, p , enforcement rate, η , hacking cost, kc , and user 
fixing cost, c .   
Table 2. Empirical Implications 






effort, f  
Hacker’s 
attacking 












Price, p  decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing 
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0/ ≥∂∂ cA  decreasing increasing decreasing increasing increasing Fixing 
cost, 
c  0/ <∂∂ cA  decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing 
Enforcement rate, η  decreasing decreasing increasing increasing ambiguous 
Hacking cost, kc  decreasing decreasing increasing increasing ambiguous 
 
Our empirical implications are consistent with the actual impact of Service Pack 2 on 
information security.  Since Service Pack 2 reduced user fixing costs, Table 2 predicts that it 
would lead users to increase security efforts.  Consistent with this prediction, referring to 
Table 1, between 2004-05, the proportion of U.S. residential Internet users equipped with 
anti-virus software dropped slightly, while the proportion with properly configured firewalls 
rose from 28% to 56%, and the proportion with active or open file sharing programs dropped 
from 23% to 11%.  Meanwhile, as for hackers, between the first halves of 2004 and 2005, the 
average number of attacks against Internet-linked computers fell from 78 to 57 per day 
(Symantec 2005).  
Having analyzed the strategic interaction among end-users and between end-users and 
hacker, we now consider the software vendor’s behavior.   Insecurity of systems and software 
is like a degradation of product quality where the quality depends on the users’ effort.  In 
such an environment, how should a vendor set price? 
By assumption, the cost of producing the software is zero, hence, by (7), the vendor’s 
profit is 
∫ Φ=Π n ndp
ˆ
0
)(          (11) 
The profit-maximizing price is characterized by the first-order condition, 
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0
nd dn dd n p n
dp dp dn
∏ = Φ + Φ =∫ .      (12) 














∂= ˆˆˆˆ        (13) 
since, by Observation 3, 0/ˆ <∂∂ kn , and by Table 2, 0/ <dpdk .  Intuitively, the indirect 
(feedback) effect of a price increase on hacker effort causes demand to be less elastic.  
Accordingly, by (12) and (13), the vendor should set a relatively higher price than in the 
absence of hacking. 
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6. Limitations and Future Work 
Our analysis assumed that there was only one hacker.  The key direction for future work is to 
analyze a setting with multiple hackers.  Then, the essential issue would be how the efforts of 
the various hackers interact, and specifically, whether these are complementary or substitutes. 
The second important limitation is that we assumed that the user’s cost of fixing was 
exogenous.  Realistically, both government and vendor affect this cost.  It would be 
interesting to incorporate these decisions into the analysis. 
Finally, it is important to apply our analytical framework to study public policy 
towards information security.   Information security can be and are addressed from two 
angles – encouraging end-users to fix quickly, and enforcement against hacking.  Both 
policies are costly.  Owing to the strategic interaction, policies directed at end-users will 
affect hacker behavior, and enforcement against hacking will affect end-user behavior.  Using 
our analysis, we can characterize the appropriate balance between the two policy directions 
from the standpoint of social welfare.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Observation 1.  Differentiating (5) with respect to c,  
2
2( )
d fv h n
df c
αχ ∂− + =∂ ,  









∂ = <∂ − +
.       (A1) 




d fv h c
df dn
αχ ∂− + = , 









∂ = − <∂ +
.       (A2) 
Differentiating (5) with respect to χ ,  
2
2( ) ( ) 0
d d fv h v h
df df
α αχ χ
∂− + − + =∂ , 
and hence, by (1), 
2
2





∂ = − >∂ .        (A3) 
By (2), 0/ >dkdχ , hence / 0f k∂ ∂ > .  If 0=k , ( ) 0Zkχ = , hence by (5), ( | 0) 0f n k = = , 
[0,1]n∀ ∈ .  Further, if ∞→k , ( ) 1Zkχ → , hence, by (5), lim ( ) ( )k f n f n→∞ ∞= . [ ]  
Proof of Observation 2.  We first prove that )(nB  is monotone decreasing in n .   Consider 
1n and 2n such that 21 nn < .  Let user 1n  choose the fixing effort, 2( )f n , associated with user 
2n .  Since 21 nn < , her expected net benefit would be   
2 1 2
2 2 2 2
[ ] ( ( )) ( )
[ ] ( ( )) ( ) ( ),
v v h f n p n cf n
v v h f n p n cf n B n k
α χ
α χ
− + − −
> − + − − ≡    (A4) 
By (4), the fixing effort 1( )f n  must provide user 1n  with the maximum expected net benefit, 











    (A5)  
Hence, by (A4) and (A5), )()( 21 knBknB > , which is the result.  
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Since )(nB  is monotone decreasing in n , the demand of the software is described as 
follows. Consider the most sophisticated user, 0n = . By (4), her cost of fixing is zero and 
therefore she will choose the highest level of fixing, i.e., (0)f →∞ . Under the assumption 
that v p>  and by (1), the most sophisticated user would buy since (0) 0B v p= − > . 
Consider the most naïve user, 1n = . If 0)1( ≥B , then, 0)( >nB for all 1<n  and all other 
users buy the software.  However, if 0)1( <B , the most naïve user does not buy the software, 
and there exists some critical level as claimed. [ ]  
Proof of Observation 3.  Differentiating (6) with respect to c , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] 0d f n f n f n f n f nn n nv h nf n cf n cn
df c n dc dc c n dc
αχ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂− + + − − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  




∂ = − <∂ ,         (A6) 
i.e., the marginal user, nˆ , is decreasing in c. 
Differentiating (6) with respect to p,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[ ] 1 0d f n f n f n f n f nn n nv h cf n nc
df p n p p p n p
αχ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂− + + − − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
, 






∂ = − <∂         (A7) 
Differentiating (6) with respect to k , 
 ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] ( ) 0d f f n d n f f nv h v h f n cf n cn
df k n k dk k k n k
α χχ α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , 
hence, using (5), [ ] ( )
( )
ˆ( )ˆ ( ) 0
ˆ
v h f nn d Zk
k cf n dk
α χ+∂ = − <∂       (A8) 
Further differentiating (A8) with respect to k, 







v h f n v hn d d f f n df
k cf n dk cf dk k n k df
α χ χ α α− + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= − + − >⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ , (A9) 
which follows from (1), (2), (A2), (A3), and (A8).  By (A8) and (A9), nˆ is decreasing and 
convex in k . 
If 0→k , then ( ) 0Zkχ → . Hence by (4), users’ expected net benefit, 
( ) ( )B n v p ncf n→ − − , which is maximized with ( ) 0f n = . Thus pvnB −→)( , for all n.  
Since v p> , all users buy the software.  Accordingly, if 0→k , then ˆ 1n → .  
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Now, if ∞→k , then 1)( →kχ , hence, by (4), users’ expected net benefit, 
( ) [ ] ( ( )) ( )B n v v h f n p ncf nα→ − + − − .  As proved by Observation 2, the most sophisticated 
user would buy the software, i.e., (0 | ) 0B k →∞ > . Consider the user with 1=n .  If her 
expected net benefit, (1) [ ] ( (1)) (1) 0B v v h f p cfα→ − + − − ≥ , then by Observation 2, 
( ) 0B n >  for all n. Hence all users will buy the software.  Otherwise, if 0)1( <B , then there 
exists some 0nˆ  such that  
0ˆ( )B n → 0ˆ[ ] ( ( ))v v h f nα− + 0ˆp n− − 0ˆ( ) 0cf n = ,     
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Observation 4.  To simply notation, define 
( ) ( )ˆ ( )
0
( | ) ( )
n k
k f m k d mαΑ ≡ Φ∫ .       (A10) 
Since 0d dfα < , then 0A f∂ ∂ < . Further ˆ 0n∂Α ∂ > .  Substituting (A10) in (9), and 
then differentiating with respect to η , 
[ ] 22 2 2( ) ( )1 Kd cd Zk d Zk k keA dk dk dk
χ χη η η
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
 










∂ = <∂ − −
.      (A11) 
 Similarly, differentiating (9) with respect to nˆ , 
22
2 2
ˆ(1 ) (1 ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ
Kd cd d k ke e n
n dk dk n dk n
χ χη η∂Α ∂ ∂− + − Α =∂ ∂ ∂ , 





ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )K
dek n dk




∂Α−∂ ∂= >∂ − − Α
.      (A12) 
When ˆ 0n = , no one buys the software, it doesn’t pay for the hacker to attack the 
software, hence 0k = .  When ˆ 1n = , all users buy the software. Since the hacker’s expected 
net benefit, (8), is concave in k , there exists 1k  that satisfies the first order condition, (9), and 
maximizes the expected net benefit. 
Similarly, we can show that 
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ˆ(1 ) ( )K
de
k f dk




∂Α−∂ ∂= <∂ − − Α
,      (A13) 
and that there exists some 0 0k >  such that if 0f = , then 0k k= , and there exists some 
0k∞ >  such that if f →∞ , then k k∞= . 
Proof of Lemma 1.  By Observations 1 and 3 respectively, f  is increasing in k  and nˆ  is 
decreasing in k .  Accordingly, )(kA is monotonically decreasing in k , regardless of the user 
distribution ( )nΦ .  Further, if 0=k , then by (2), 0=χ , hence all users would choose 
0)( =nf  and, by (4), get pvnB −=)|( χ .  By assumption, 0>− pv , hence, if 0=k , 1ˆ =n , 
and so, 0>A . 
With regard to hacker effort, by Observation 4, k  is monotonically increasing in A .  
Further, if 0=A  (because either 0ˆ =n  or 0)( =nf , for all n ), then the hacker will not 
expend any effort to attack the software, 0=k .  
Figure 3 depicts ( )k Α and ( )kΑ , which describe the best response functions of the 
hacker and users, respectively.  Since the functions are continuous, they have a non-trivial 
intersection, say ),( ** Ak . 
Given hacker effort *k , let *ˆ( )n k  and )|( *knf be the marginal user and the user 




( ( | )) ( )
n k
A f n k d nα′ ≡ Φ∫ .        
Now, we claim that AA ′=* , and prove the claim by contradiction as follows.   
(i) Suppose otherwise that *AA >′ .  Then, referring to Figure 3, the function ( )k Α  
gives the hacker’s best-response effort k ′ .  Since ( )k Α  is monotonically 
increasing in A , we have *kk >′ . Since nˆ  is decreasing in k  and (.)f  is 
increasing in k , it follows that 'ˆ( )n k *ˆ( )n k<  and )|()|( *knfknf >′ , which 
implies that *AA <′ , which contradicts the original assumption. 
(ii) Suppose otherwise that *AA <′ .  Then, referring to Figure 3,  the function ( )k Α  
gives the hacker’s best-response effort k ′ .  Since ( )k Α  is monotonically 
increasing in A , we have *kk <′ .  Since nˆ  is decreasing in k  and (.)f  is 
increasing in k , it follows that 'ˆ( )n k *ˆ( )n k>  and )|()|( *knfknf <′ , which 
implies that *AA >′ , which contradicts the original assumption. 
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Therefore, we must have AA ′=* , and there exists a non-trivial equilibrium 
comprising *k , *ˆ( )n k  and )|)(ˆ( ** kknf . [ ] 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Expand (12) to distinguish between the fixing effort of end-user n′  












)())(())(()())((]1[ αααχη . (A14) 
By (A14), an increase in fixing effort, f , by all other users except n′  would reduce the term 
in brackets, and hence induce the hacker to reduce their effort, 0<Δk .  This would imply 
0<Δχ , which in (5), shifts down the left-hand side. Therefore, user 'n  would reduce ( ')f n .  
[ ] 
Proof of Proposition 2.  This follows directly from the proof of Table 2, by noting that (A16) 
will hold, and hence 0/ ≥∂∂ cA , if c  is sufficiently high, and not hold if c  is sufficiently low.   
Proof of Table 2 
















User fixing cost, c  
By Observations 1 and 4, an increase in the user fixing cost, c , directly leads users to reduce 
their fixing effort, f , and the software demand, nˆ .   By (10), these have conflicting effects 
on the users’ best-response function ( )A k .  By (9), the increase in the user fixing cost has no 
direct effect on ( )k A .  Accordingly, the net effect on hacking effort, k , and conditional 
vulnerability, A , depends on the sign of cA ∂∂ / . 
 Differentiating (10) with respect to c , 
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( )
nA c k n d n d f nf n d n
c c dn df c
αα∂ ∂ Φ ∂= + Φ∂ ∂ ∂∫     (A15) 
Substituting from (5), (A1), and (A6) in (A15), it follows that 0A c∂ ∂ > if and only if 
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χ .     (A16) 
We analyze two cases below. 
(i) 0/ ≥∂∂ cA .  Referring to Figure A, an increase in c  would lead to a new 
equilibrium, with higher hacking effort, *2
*




1 AA ≤ , and hence higher effective vulnerability, *2*2*1*1 )()( AkAk χχ ≤ .  











∂= ˆˆˆ .       (A17) 
By Observation 3, 0/ˆ <∂∂ cn  and 0/ˆ <∂∂ kn , while from above, 0/ >dcdk .  
Hence, substituting in (A17), we have 0/ˆ <dcnd . 
Regarding the fixing effort, from above, *2
*
1 AA ≤ , hence 
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dc dc dn df dc
αα Φ= + Φ ≥∫ .    (A18) 
Now, 0/ˆ <dcnd , hence, substituting in (A18), it follows that 0/ <dcdf . 
(ii) 0/ <∂∂ cA .  Referring to Figure A, an increase in c  would lead to a new 
equilibrium, with lower hacking effort, *2
*




1 AA > , and hence lower effective vulnerability, *2*2*1*1 )()( AkAk χχ > .   
With regard to fixing effort, 
df f f dk
dc c k dc
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ .        (A19) 
By Observation 1, 0/ <∂∂ cf  and 0/ >∂∂ kf , while from above, 0/ <dcdk .  
Hence, substituting in (A19), we have 0/ <dcdf .   
Regarding the marginal user, from above, *2
*
1 AA > , hence 
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dc dc dn df dc
αα Φ= + Φ <∫ .    (A20) 
Now, 0/ <dcdf , hence, substituting in (A20), it follows that 0/ˆ <dcnd . 
Enforcement rate, η , and hacking cost, (.)Kc  
First, consider the effect of an increase in enforcement, η .  By Observations 1 and 3, the 
increase in enforcement has no direct effect on the users’ fixing effort or demand nˆ .  Hence, 
by (10), the best-response function ( )A k  remains unchanged.  By Observation 4, the 
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enforcement increase directly leads hackers to reduce effort, hence their best-response 
function, ( )k A , shifts to the left.  Accordingly, in the new equilibrium, hacking effort is 
lower, *2
*
1 kk > , and the conditional vulnerability is higher, *2*1 AA < .   
Since the increase in enforcement results in lower hacker effort, k , hence lower 
hacker effectiveness, )(kχ , but higher conditional vulnerability, A , the impact on the 
effective user vulnerability, Aχ , depends on the balance of the effects on hackers and users.  









∂= .        (A21) 
By (5), 0/ =∂∂ ηf , by Observation 1, 0/ >∂∂ kf , while from above, 0/ <ηddk .  Hence, 
substituting in (A21), we have 0/ <ηddf . 
Similarly, with regard to the marginal user, i.e., software demand, 
ˆ ˆ ˆdn n n dk
d k dη η η
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ .        (A22) 
By (6), 0/ˆ =∂∂ ηn , by Observation 3, 0/ˆ <∂∂ kn , while from above, 0/ <ηddk .  Hence, 
substituting in (A22), we have 0/ˆ >ηdnd , which completes the proof. 
The effect of an increase in the hacking cost is similar.  For brevity, we omit the proof. 
Price, p  
By Observation 1, a price increase has no direct effect on the user’s fixing effort, while, by 
Observation 3, the price increase directly reduces the demand, nˆ .  Accordingly, by (10), for 
0>k , the best-response function ( )A k  shifts downward, while, by (10), for 0=k , )0(A  
does not change with p.  By (9), the price increase has no direct effect on ( )k A .   
Figure A depicts the new equilibrium: the users’ best-response function shifts 
from 1( )A k  downward to 2 ( )A k , while the hackers’ best-response function remains unchanged.  
In the new equilibrium, hacking effort is lower, *2
*
1 kk > , and the conditional vulnerability is 
lower, *2
*
1 AA > .  
Given that the increase in price, p , leads to lower hacking effort, k , it would, by (2) 
result in lower hacker effectiveness, χ .  Thus, the effective user vulnerability, Aχ , decreases 
with price, p. 











∂= .        (A23) 
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2006) 
© 2006, Png, Tang, and Wang 22
By (5) 0/ =∂∂ pf , by Observation 1, 0/ >∂∂ kf , while from above, 0/ <dpdk .  Hence, 
substituting in (A23), we have 0/ <dpdf . 




( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
n
nd f n d ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dp dp dp dn df dp
α αα
Φ Φ= = + Φ <
∫ ∫ . (A24) 
Now, 0/ <dpdf , hence  
ˆ
0
( ) ( ) 0
n d df n d n
df dp
α Φ >∫ . 
Substituting in (A24), it follows that 0/ˆ <dpnd , which completes the proof. [ ] 
